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Wilson: Wilson: New Requirements

New Requirements of Creditor Notice in
Probate Proceedings
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope'

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 2

v.

Applying this requirement, the United States Supreme Court in Mullane
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.3 held that statutory notice by

newspaper publication did not satisfy the requirements of due process with
'4
respect to "known present beneficiaries of known place of residence."

The Supreme Court subsequently held unconstitutional other notice-bypublication provisions.5 But before Tulsa Professional Collection Services,
Inc. v. Pope, the vast majority of states took the position, through court
decisions and statutes, that publication notice was sufficient in probate
6
proceedings .
The continued use and acceptance of publication notice in probate
proceedings was due to the combination of the weight of custom, 7 third

1. 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
2. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 318.
5. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
6. For an exhaustive tabulation, see Falender, Notice To CreditorsIn Estate
Proceedings: What Process Is Due?, 63 N.C.L. REv. 659, 660-61 n.7, 8 (1985).
7. "The fact that a procedure is so old as to have become customary and
well known in the community is of great weight in determining whether it conforms
to due process for 'Not lightly vacated is the verdict of quiescent years."' Anderson
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944) (quoting Cardozo's opinion in
Coler v. The Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136 (1928).
Justice White, writing for the Court in Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89 (1905),
reacted strongly to a due process challenge of the probate of a will without the
statutory notice when he wrote "Indeed the contention made on this subject amounts
to asserting that every state lav which provides for a probate in common form

is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution .

. . ."

Id. at 118. See

also Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922). But see Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) ("The fact that a procedure would pass
muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all
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party reliance on the validity of the probate decree,' the in rem nature of
probate, 9 and other practical and procedural reasons. 0
The Supreme Court directly addressed Mullane's applicability to nonclaim statutes for the first time" in Pope, and held that "If [the creditor's]

property in its modem forms.").
This feeling was well stated in Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 2 Kan.
App. 506, 582 P.2d 742 (1978) when the court said "No one would suggest, we
suppose, that the heirs must seek out the decedent's creditors and notify them of
the death, or that their failure to do so deprives the creditor of his property without
due process of law by the running of the statute of limitations, even though he
may not have been aware that it was running." Id. at -,
582 P.2d at 745.
8. See Note, Due Process - The Requirement Of Notice In Probate Proceedings, 40 Mo. L. REv. 552, 560 (1975) (pointing out that the problem of third
party reliance on the final decree was not present in Mullane).
9. See Goodrich v. Farris, 214 U.S. 71 (1909); see also Comment, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HAv. L. Rv. 1257, 1269 (1957)
[hereinafter Comment, Requirements of Notice]; Comment, Probate Proceedings Administration of Decedents Estates - The Mullane Case and Due Process of Law,
50 Mic. L. Rv. 124, 128 n.18 (1951) [hereinafter Comment, Probate Proceedings].
Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.013 (1986) states:
The administration of the estate of a decedent from the filing of the
application for letters testamentary or of administration until the decree
of final distribution and the discharge of the last personal representative
is deemed one proceeding for purposes of jurisdiction. Such entire proceeding is a proceeding in rem.
Compare Wolff v. Rager, 30 S.W.2d 1005, 1008 (Mo. 1930), where the court
stated, "Proceedings in the probate courts of this state are not strictly in rem;
.they are somewhat in the nature of proceedings in rem, in which persons in interest
are afforded an opportunity to be heard."
10. John A. Borron Jr. points out that "Since the identity of all interested
persons, e.g., creditors, cannot be ascertained when letters are granted, publication
of notice of letters granted is the only effective means of complying with the notice
requirements of due process." Borron, Independent Administration And Other
Matters Under The New Code, 37 J. Mo. BAR 13, 13 (1981).
11. In 1982, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order
barring a creditor's claim as not being timely filed. The estate had published notice
pursuant to Nevada statute, and had taken no further action to notify the claimant
of the probate proceedings. The estate had actual knowledge of the claim.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion
and remanded the case for consideration in light of Mennonite Bd. of Missions
v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), handed down one week earlier. Continental Ins.
Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983). On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and concluded that "more than service by publication was
required in order to afford due process to [the known creditor]." Continental Ins.
Co. v. Moseley, 683 P.2d 20, 21 (Nev. 1984).
Previously, the United States Supreme Court dismissed an estate creditor's
appeal in Baker Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 393 U.S. 530 (1969). The creditor had
argued that the Montana nonclaim statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 91-2704 (1947),
was unconstitutional because it allowed "the taking of a person's property from
him without notice by either mail or personal delivery when such actual notice can

be accomplished with ease and little effort ...

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/12
445 P.2d 574, 575 (1968).

."

Baker Nat'l Bank v. Henderson,
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identity was known or 'reasonably ascertainable,' then termination of [the
creditor's] claim without actual notice violated due process."' 12
This Note will review the treatment of the due process notice aspects
of probate proceedings and discuss the possible effects of Pope on Missouri's
probate practice, specifically upon the nonclaim statute.
In a probate proceeding the probate court and the decendent's personal
representative collect the estate's assets, pay the decendent's debts, and
distribute the remainder among the beneficiaries.' 3 The purpose of a nonclaim statute is to promote a quick and orderly disposition of the estate. 4
Unlike a general statute of limitations which merely withholds the remedy, 5
nonclaim statutes destroy the claim a party may have against the estate.
Under Missouri's probate procedures, the application for letters tes-

tamentary or of administration must state the names and addresses of the
surviving spouse, heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent. 16 Once the
application is filed the clerk of the court publishes a notice of the appointment of the personal representative. 17 This notice is published in a

newspaper once a week for four consecutive weeks.' 8 The clerk also sends
a copy of the notice by ordinary mail to each heir and devisee listed in
the application. 19 She then files proof of publication of notice and proof

of mailing of notice within ten days of the completion of publication. 20
The first publication of notice triggers the six month nonclaim period. 21
Section 473.360 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri is the nonclaim
statute of the Missouri Probate Code. Section 473.360 provides:
Except as provided in section 473.370 [pertaining to judgment creditors], all claims against the estate of a deceased person, other than costs
and expenses of administration, . . . claims of the United States and claims
of any taxing authority ... which are not filed ... or are not paid by

12. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1348.
13. E.g., North v. Hawkinson, 324 S.W.2d 733, 745 (Mo. 1959).
14. Rhodes v. Lockwood, 695 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); accord
Minor v. Lillard, 306 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1957).
One of the purposes of the nonclaim statutes is to provide a method
whereby at the termination of a reasonable period the real and personal
property not needed to meet the obligations of the estate will be free for
distribution to the rightful owners without waiting until every claim has
been finally adjudicated, which could take several years as it has in this
case.
Id. at 544.
15. Estate of Thomas, 743 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Donnelly,
J., dissenting).
16.

Mo. REv.

STAT.

§ 473.017.1(2) (1986).

17. Id. § 473.033.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 473.360.1.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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the personal representative, within six months after the first published
notice of letters testamentary or of administration, are forever barred
against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees and
legatees ....
Section 473.433.1 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri prohibits the
court from allowing a claim, except costs of administration, unless the
claim "has been served upon the personal representative and has either
been filed with the court or acknowledged by the personal representative
22
in writing to be a just claim" within the six month nonclaim period.
Courts and the Missouri Revised Statutes characterize probate proceedings as in rem. 23 Notice by publication has traditionally been deemed
sufficient for such proceedings.2 The Supreme Court rarely has addressed
the due process characteristics of probate notice because the statutory
publication notice infrequently has been challenged as inadequate.2 Further,
when statutes were attacked on constitutional grounds, the Court routinely
26
upheld statutory publication notice.

22. Id. § 473.433; Rhodes v. Lockwood, 695 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985). See generally Comment, Recent Developments In Missouri: Probate
Code - Claims, 49 UMKC L. REv. 534 (1981); see also Falender, supra note 6;
Borron, supra note 10.
23. See supra note 9. American probate procedures have evolved from English
law with very little change. In England, the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction
over the estates of deceased persons. A will was presented by the executor either
in common form or solemn form. Common form probate consisted of an ex parte
proceeding, with the executor proving the wills execution by his own oath. Probate
in solemn form required notice to interested persons, with no reexamination except
upon appeal. Probate in common form could be contested at any time within thirty
years.
Missouri has adopted what is essentially common form probate with the
possibility of a will contest and the equivalent of solemn form probate, if filed
in the circuit court within six months. See Mo. Rv. STAT. § 473.083 (1986);
Comment, Requirements of Notice, supra note 9, at 1269 n.86; Comment, Probate
Proceedings, supra note 9, at 131; Note, supra, note 8, at 556-57 n.26.
24. Comment, Requirements of Notice, supra note 9, at 1260-70.
25. Comment, Probate Proceedings, supra note 9, at 132.
26. In In re Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1874), the Court
denied the challenge of a California probate statute which provided for notice by
publication, followed by a one year period during which the will could be contested.
The probate was challenged by a party who had received no actual notice until
the one year period had passed. The Court upheld the California statute, declaring:
Parties cannot thus, by their seclusion from the means of information,
claim exemption from the laws that control human affairs, and set up a
right to open up all the transactions of the past. The world must move
on, and those who claim an interest in persons or things must be charged
with knowledge of their status and condition, and of the vicissitudes to
which they are subject. This is the foundation of all judicial proceedings
in rem.
Id. at 519.
In 1887, the Court again upheld publication notice of probate proceedings in
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/12
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In other contexts, however, the United States Supreme Court has dealt
with notice issues. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,27
the Court defined the notice standard required by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In Mullane, the trust company petitioned for
a judicial settlement of its accounts pursuant to New York law. 28 The

statute required newspaper publication of notice containing only a minimum
of information. 29 The court-appointed special guardian and attorney for
the beneficiaries objected, claiming that the statutory notice violated the
due process rights of the absent beneficiaries. The Court held this statutory
notice to be inadequate because "it is not reasonably calculated to reach
'30
those who could easily be informed by other means at hand.
The Supreme Court refined the Mullane doctrine with its 1983 decision
in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams.3 In Mennonite, the State of
Indiana initiated tax lien foreclosure proceedings against a mortgagor's
property. The state foreclosure statute required that the "owner" receive

actual notice of the proceedings, but did not require notice to the mortgagee. 32 The Court reaffirmed Mullane, requiring actual notice to mortgagees
33
who are reasonably ascertainable.
But one commentator argues that Mennonite departs from Mullane
rather than refine it:14 "The Mennonite Court, though purporting to rely
on Mullane, ignored the balancing approach used in that decision. Justice
Marshall's opinion [in Mennonite] considered only the interests of the party

adversely affected and cursorily35 labelled the burden on [the party giving

notice] as 'relatively modest."'

Culbertson v. H. Witbeck Co., 127 U.S. 326 (1887) saying "Unless the necessary
parties in such cases could be brought before the court by publication there would
be in many cases an impossibility of doing it at all." Id. at 333. See also Christianson
v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 (1915) (notice by publication was an appropriate
form of notice to interested persons); Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71 (1909)
(upholding California's probate notice provision); Ferrell v. O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89
(1905) (Washington common form probate statute satisfied fourteenth amendment).
27. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
28. N.Y. BANKING LAw § 100-c(12) (1937). This settlement, and the resulting
court decree act to terminate all rights of persons having an interest in the trust
fund. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311.
29. "[T]he only notice required, and the only one given was by newspaper
publication setting forth merely the name and address of the trust company, the
name and the date of establishment of the common trust fund, and a list of all
participating estates trusts or funds." Id. at 310.
30. Id. at 319.
31. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
32. Id. at 794.
33. Id. at 801.
34. See Comment, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams: Expansion Of
The Due Process Notice Requirement, 46 LA. L. REv. 311 (1985).
35.

Id. at 315-16.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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Justice O'Connor's dissent in Mennonite, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, criticized the majority's apparently inflexible rule3 6 and urged an
adherence to the balancing approach in Mullane:
Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior decisions and holds
that before the state conducts any proceeding that will affect the legally
protected property interests of any party, the State must provide notice
to that party by means certain to ensure actual notice as37long as the
party's identity and location are "reasonably ascertainable.
A more moderate reading of the majority opinion, however, simply
reasons that the Court in Mennonite narrowed the analysis from whether
the notice was reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to reach
interested parties, to whether the names of such persons were reasonably
ascertainable.38
The Mullane decision launched a new evaluation of statutory notice
provisions in many areas. Appellate courts have subsequently held that
39
publication notice is constitutionally inadequate in bankruptcy proceedings,
4
4
4
condemnation proceedings, 0 forcible entry and detainer actions' ' tax sales, 2
automobile forfeiture proceedings43 and others. 4

36. The Pope decision was also authored by Justice O'Connor. Albeit narrower, it is just as inflexible as Mennonite. O'Connor criticized the majority in
Mennonite for failing to weigh the abilities of the party "to safeguard its interests"
in determining the notice due, but there is no such discussion in Pope. Mennonite,
462 U.S. at 808.
37. Id.at 802.
38. Bender v. City of Rochester, 765 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1985).
39. E.g., New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 294
(1953) (bankruptcy proceedings trigger specific time period in which creditors' claim
must be filed).
40. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (publication
was inadequate when owner's name was readily ascertainable); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (notice of condemnation proceedings published
in a local newspaper inadequate as to known landowner).
41. E.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982) (posting a summons on
tenant's door inadequate means of providing notice).
42. E.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (publication notice to interested parties other than owner of property inadequate).
The Missouri Supreme Court immediately reached a similar result when it held
that when the deed of trust is recorded, "notice [of tax sale] by publication alone
is insufficient and must be supplemented by notice mailed to the beneficiary's last
known available address or by personal service." Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 654 S.W.2d
883, 886 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
43. E.g., Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (per curiam) (proceeding
was invalid because notice was mailed to appellant's home when state knew he
was being held in jail).
44. See Williams'v. Berrey, 492 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1973) (en banc) (replevin);
In re Barger, 365 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (parental rights). But see Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) (notice by publication naming the last
known owner sufficient in escheat action).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/12
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While requiring notice in other actions affecting property rights, 45 Mis-

souri courts have steadfastly upheld Missouri's probate notice statutes. In
Haas v. Haas,46 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
nonclaim provisions of section 473.08347 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.
The appellant had challenged the constitutionality of the will contest notice
provisions, 48 saying that "absent a requirement for due diligence on the
part of the applicant, [these statutes] are unconstitutional for their failure
to require a good faith attempt to give an heir or legatee the notice to
which he is entitled under the fifth and fourteenth amendments ... .-49
The court held that section 473.083 controlled, and that fraud did not toll
5
the running of the period during which a party may contest a will. 0
The definitive statement by the Missouri Supreme Court came in Estate
of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc. 51 The court unequivocally held that
52
due process does not require any more than publication notice to a creditor.
It distinguished Mullane, saying:
In Mullane, and the cases following it, the person to be notified was, in
effect, made an actual party to the litigation by the notice, and the judgment
of the court operated directly on that person's property. Notice under a
nonclaim statute does not make a creditor a party to the 5proceeding; it
merely notifies him that he may become one if he wishes. 1

45. E.g., Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 654 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). In

1966, the court in Clapper v. Chandler, 406 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966),

set aside an order of sale of intestate's property to satisfy creditors' claims, when
the probate court's hearing on the petition to sell was held twenty-four days after
publication of notice to heirs instead of thirty to forty-two as mandated in statute.
The court held that since personal notice was not given to the heirs, the order of
sale was void, "not merely irregular or erroneous." Clapper, 406 S.W.2d at 120.
The Missouri Supreme Court later held in Bollenger v. Bray, 411 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.
1967), that final settlement of a will without additional notice, after published
notice eight years before, did not satisfy due process.
46. 504 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1973).
47. Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.083 (1986) provides in part:
Unless any person interested in the probate of a will appears within six
months after the date of the probate.., thereof.., or within six months
after the first publication of notice of granting of letters on the estate of
the decedent, which ever is later, and by petition filed ... contests the
validity of a probated will, ... then probate ... of the will is binding.

48. Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.017 (1986) requires that the personal representative
shall state in the application for letters testamentary or administration the names
and addresses of the surviving spouse and heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent.
Mo. Rn-v. STAT. § 473.033 (1986) then directs the clerk of the probate division to
mail a copy of the published notice to each heir and devisee named in the application.
49. Haas, 504 S.W.2d at 46.
50. Id.
51. 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
52. Id.at 89.
53.

Id. at 88.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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The Missouri court, in a critical footnote5 4 announced that it was
unpersuaded by the United States Supreme Court's treatment of Continental
Insurance Co. v. Moseley.55 In Moseley, the United States Supreme Court
remanded a Nevada Supreme Court decision for consideration in light of
Mennonite Board of Missions.56 The Missouri Supreme Court dismissed
the importance of the United States Supreme Court's decision: "The Supreme Court's procedure - granting certiorari, vacating and remanding for
further consideration in light of Mennonite Board of Missions - does not
hold, Mullane
conclusively indicate that the Supreme Court has held, or5 will
7
applicable in the circumstances of the remanded case".
One year later, in Cool v. Reed,58 the Missouri court faced a similar
challenge of the statute barring will contests not filed within six months
of publication. 9 The court upheld that notice provision stating "the notice
precepts of Mullane and Mennonite do not apply and hence do not save
[the heir's] cause of action from her own failure to file a timely will
contest." 6
In 1987, the Oklahoma Supreme Court faced a due process challenge
to its nonclaim statute. 6' Appellant Tulsa Professional Collection Services,
Inc. [hereinafter Tulsa] was the assignee of a debt owed to St. John's
Medical Center for expenses incurred during the last illness of H. Everett
Pope, Jr.. The personal representative 62 of the decedent's estate published

54.
55.
56.
463 U.S.
57.
58.

Id. at 87 n.2.
463 U.S. 1202 (1983). Moseley is discussed supra note 11.
100 Nev. 337, 683 P.2d 20 (1984) (on remand from the Supreme Court,
1202 (1983). See supra note 11.
Busch, 700 S.W.2d at 87 n.2 (citation omitted).
717 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
59. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 473.083 (1986). See supra note 47 and accompanying

text.

60. The court also flatly refused to disturb Haas, and stated "What was

said about § 473.360 in Busch is equally applicable to § 473.083 in this case."
Cool, 717 S.W.2d at 520.
61. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 733 P.2d 396 (Okla.
1986), rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988). Oklahoma's nonclaim statute, OKLA. STAT.,
tit. 58, § 331 (1981), differs from Missouri's statute in its provision for a two
month period in which to file a claim, instead of the six months provided for in
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 473.360 and 473.083 (1986).

The Oklahoma Supreme Court was also presented with a question as the effect
of statutory provisions related to the expenses of the last illness. The United States
Supreme Court did not deal with this aspect of the case and it will not be discussed
in this Note.

62. This Note will not differentiate between executors and administrators.

The Missouri Probate Code uses the term "personal representative" in those sections
added or amended in 1980 or later. Mo. REv. STAT. § 472.010.26 (1986) provides:
"Personal Representative" means executor or administrator. It includes
an administrator with the will annexed, an administrator de bonis non,

an administrator pending contest, an administrator during minority or

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/12

8

Wilson: Wilson: New Requirements

19891

PROBATE CREDITOR NOTICE

notice as required by the statute, 63 and no timely claim was presented4 to

the personal representative within the prescribed four month periodA
The trial court and the court of appeals held the claim barred because
it was not timely filed.6 5 Tulsa raised the issue of due process in its petition
for rehearing, arguing that due process required that actual notice be given
to a known creditor. The court of appeals denied rehearing, saying that
the notice argument could not be raised for the first time in the petition

for rehearing. 6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, after stating that a question of notice

isdirected at the court's jurisdiction and can be raised at any time, addressed
for the first time the question of the notice required under its probate
nonclaim statute.6 7 Relying principally on Missouri's decision in Busch, the

of the statute
Oklahoma court held "actual notice of the potential operation
' 68
of nonclaims is not required to constitute due process.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court conclusively addressed

the question whether publication notice, followed by a specified period in
which to file claims against the estate, satisfies the due process clause of
69
the fourteenth amendment.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, first discussed whether the
fourteenth amendment protected Tulsa's interest. The Court found the issue
to be "affirmatively settled by the Mullane case itself, where the Court
held that a cause of action is a species of property protected by the
70
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."

absence, and any other type of administrator of the estate of a decedent
whose appointment is permitted. It does not include an executor de son
tort.
63. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 331 (1981) requires the personal representative to
give notice to the creditors of the deceased that they must file their claims within
two months of the date of the first publication. This notice must be published in
a newspaper in the county in which probate is filed once each week for two
consecutive weeks. Notice was published on July 17, 1979 and July 24, 1979. Pope,
108 S. Ct. at 1343.
64. Pope, 733 P.2d at 397. These facts were stipulated by the parties.
65. Id. This ruling was based on that court's construction of the statute

relating to will contests.
66. Id. at 399.
67. Id. at 399-400.

68. Id. at 400.
69. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1342.
70. Id. at 1345 (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
428 (1982)). The Court in Logan commented that "the types of interests protected
as 'property' are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating 'to the whole
domain of social and economic fact."' Logan, 455 U.S. at 430 (quoting National
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). The Logan Court also listed other property interests found to have
due process protection, including a horse trainer's license, disability benefits, high
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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The Court next examined the state's involvement in the operation of
the nonclaim statute. "The Fourteenth Amendment protects this interest,
however, only from a deprivation by state action." ' 7' The Court had spoken
to a related issue before. It had held that the operation of a general statute
of limitations does not involve sufficient state action to warrant due process
protection,7 2 and that plaintiffs are not entitled to notification from either
the state or the defendant that their claim is about to be time-barred.73
Further, "private use of state sanctioned private remedies or procedures
74
does not rise to the level of state action.")

With this background of authority, the personal representative in Pope

relied on Texaco, Inc. v. Short,75 in which the Supreme Court held that
the potential plaintiffs do not have a due process right to notice that a
statute of limitations is about to expire. But the Pope Court drew a critical
distinction between a self-executing statute of limitation and a statute of
limitation where "the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time bar
.
"...-76Accordingly, the Court distinguished Texaco, Inc. on the ground
that the statute dealt with in that case was a self-executing statute of
limitations. The Texaco, Inc. statute was characterized as "a rule of law
uniformly affecting all citizens that establishes the circumstances in which
a property interest will lapse through the inaction of its owner. '"77 The

school education, utility service, government employment, a driver's license, and
welfare benefits. Id. at 432.
The Missouri Supreme Court had reached a similar conclusion as early as 1912
when it stated "[n]o authority need be cited to demonstrate that an equity in
incumbered real estate is property, and therefore under protection of the Constitution." State ex rel. Deems v. Holtcamp, 245 Mo. 655, 670, 151 S.W 153, 157
(1912).
71. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1345.
72. Id. at 1345; Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d
86, 89 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
73. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 537 (1982).
74. Id. The question arises as to whether the holding in Pope would apply
to an independent administration. While the independent personal representative
must abide by all of the probate code provisions, "it is clearly possible to conduct
an entire administration without a single judicial act by the court." Borron, supra
note 10, at 14-15.
75. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
76. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1346. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his forceful dissent,
disputes this distinction. He writes that the majority's determination that the probate
court's involvement is inconsistent with a self-executing time bar is:
[0]ut of context and contrary to common sense. That term refers only to
the absence of a judicial or other determination that itself extinguishes
the claimant's rights. This is made clear by the Texaco, Inc. Court's
juxtaposition of "the self executing feature of the [Indiana] statute and
a subsequent judicial determination that a particular lapse did in fact
occur."
Id. at 1349 (quoting Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 533).
77. Texaco Inc., 454 U.S. at 537.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/12

10

Wilson: Wilson: New Requirements

1989]

PROBATE CREDITOR NOTICE

199

only state action involved is the enactment of the statute, which "falls
short of constituting the type of state action required to implicate the
'78
protections of the Due Process Clause."
Having drawn this distinction between the two types of statutes acting
to terminate property interests, the Court examined the level of the state
involvement in Oklahoma's nonclaim statute's operation. This is the point
at which the Court's reasoning differed from that of those courts which
had upheld the constitutionality of nonclaim statutes.7 9 The Court noted
that the probate court must appoint the personal representative before
notice can be given. Additionally, the personal representative must file an
affidavit of publication and copies of the notice with the court. Having
found this to be "significant state action," 80 the Court stated "in such
circumstances, due process is directly implicated and actual notice generally
is required."'"
The last step in the court's analysis was application of Mullane's
balancing test. The Mullane Court had declared: "Against this interest of
interest sought to be protected
the State we must balance the individual
'8 2
by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Here, after a cursory examination of the interests of the creditors, the
personal representative, and the state, 83 the Court determined "a requirement
of actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors is not so
78. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1345.
79. The Busch court stated "We agree with this distinction and believe that
the nonclaim statute, and its potential for barring a creditor's claim, does not
constitute an adjudicatory proceeding. The due process requirements of Mullane
are not applicable to these probate proceedings. Section 473.360 is a self-executing
statute of limitations. The bar created by operation of a statute of limitations
operates independently of any adjudicatory process." Estate of Busch v. FerrellDuncan Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (citations omitted).
See also Cool v. Reed, 717 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Haas v. Haas,
504 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Mo. 1973).
80. Pope, 108 S.Ct. at 1345. This conclusion is by no means inescapable.
In Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, he points out that "Virtually meaningless state

involvement, or lack of it, rather than the effect of the statute in question on the
rights of the party whose claim is cut off, is held dispositive." Pope, 108 S. Ct.
at 1349.
81.

Id. at 1346.

82. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1950).
83. The Court recognized the interest of the creditor in pursuing the claim

against the estate, and that the creditor may well be unaware of a debtor's death.
Significant, too, was the potentially adversarial relationship between the personal
representative and the creditor, making it unlikely that the personal representative
would voluntarily advise the creditor of the expiration of the claim period. These
factors outweighed the state's interest in the prompt and efficient settlement of
decedent's estates. The Court stated that actual notice to those creditors who are
reasonably ascertainable is "not inconsistent with the goals reflected in nonclaim
statutes." Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1347.
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cumbersome as to unduly hinder the dispatch with which probate proceedings are conducted." 4
The Court reached that determination after reviewing the length to
which the personal representative need go to satisfy this requirement." The
applicable standard set out in Mullane, and refined in Mennonite, is based
on reasonableness." The Pope Court concluded "all that [the personal
representative] need do is make 'reasonably diligent efforts' to uncover the
' 87
identities of creditors.
The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination
of whether the personal representative made this effort. The Court added
the explicit instruction: "If [Tulsa's] identity was known or 'reasonably
ascertainable,' then termination of [Tulsa's] claim without actual notice
violated due process." 88
There can be no doubt that the Pope decision will have a significant
impact on the administration of decedents' estates.8 9 As the duties of the
personal representative increase, there is a corresponding increase of liabilities for breach of that duty. The remainder of this Note will discuss
the duties and liabilities of the personal representative, and the remedies
available to the creditor whose fourteenth amendment rights are violated
by destruction, without notice, of his cause of action against the estate.
In the application for letters testamentary or of administration, the
personal representative promises to pay the debts and legacies and to perform
all things required by law. 90 The personal representative is required to
preserve the estate for all interested persons, including creditors. 9' While

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1347 (citation omitted).
Id.at 1348.
"The court came as close to invalidating our [nonclaim] statute as they

could have without actually having the statute before them." Borron, Probate
Attorneys Turn Creative In Notices To Estate Creditors, Missouri Law. Weekly,
Oct. 10, 1988, at 21, col. 4 (quoting Jack Challis, chairman of the Missouri Bar
Probate and Trust Committee).

90. Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.017 (1986) provides:
1. An application for letters testamentary or of administration shall state
all of the following:

(9) That if letters are issued, the applicant will make a perfect inventory
of the estate, pay the debts and legacies, if any, as far as the assets extend
and the law directs, and account for and distribute or pay all assets which
come into the possession of the personal representative, and perform all
things required by law touching the administration of the estate.

91. In Kahmann v. Buck, 446 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969), the
court stated:
It has long been understood that [a personal representative] serves in a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/12
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personal representatives do not represent the creditors against the estate, 92
they hold "the property of deceased as a trustee for the benefit of creditors,
legatees, heirs and distributees . .. .93
Should the personal representative breach this duty, the probate court
has the power to remove her, 94 reduce the compensation due, 95 or surcharge
for any loss caused by the breach. 96 By statute, the personal representative
is held personally liable only if she is personally at fault.9
Since the clerk of the probate division, rather than the personal representative, publishes the notice of letters required by Section 473.033 of
the Revised Statutes of Missouri, there is no case law defining the liability
of a personal representative for failure to give notice to a known creditor.
The 85th General Assembly has before it House Bill No. 145, which
is designed to bring the Missouri Probate Code into conformity with the
holding of Pope. That bill includes the addition of section 473.034 which
makes it the duty of the personal representative to "mail a copy of [the
published notice] by ordinary mail to all known or reasonably ascertainable
- 98 This Note will proceed on the assumption that it shall
creditors ..
be the duty of the personal representative to provide this additional notice
9
required by Pope.1

fiduciary capacity. It is his duty and he is required to look after the
interests and to act for and on behalf of all persons who have an interest,
immediate or remote, in the estate. These persons include not only the
heirs, devisees and legatees, but creditors, including taxation claimants.
Accord State ex rel. Madden v. Sartorius, 349 Mo. 1054, 163 S.W.2d 987 (Mo.
1942) (en banc); Wenzlick v. Wenzlick, 715 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
92. Runnion v. Paquet, 233 S.W.2d 803, 808 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950).
93. Rhodes v. Rhodes' Estate, 246 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
94. Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.140 (1986).
95. Id. § 473.153.4.
96. Id. § 473.597.
97. Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.820.2 (1986) provides: "A personal representative
is individually liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of the estate
or for torts committed in the course of administration of the estate only if he is
personally at fault." Although located among the independent administration statutes, this statute applies to all personal representatives. Borron, supra note 10, at
19. Section 473.820 has been interpreted to apply specifically to the liability of the
personal representative to the creditors of the estate. Estate of Gangloff, 743 S.W.2d
498, 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
After proof is made of distribution in accordance with the final decree, the
court will enter an order of discharge. This discharge triggers a one year period
during which claims may be filed against the personal representative and his surety.
Mo. Rpv. STAT. § 473.660 (1986). Claims of fraud must be brought within two
years of the discovery of the fraud, and will be barred as against one not a
perpetrator of the fraud after ten years after the commission. Mo. REv. STAT. §
472.013 (1986).
98. H.B. 145, 85th Gen. Assembly, 1st Regular Sess. (1989).
99. Prior to amendment, voluntary notice by mail or otherwise may not be
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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The Court in Pope defined the personal representative's duty, saying
that the personal representative must make "reasonably diligent efforts to
uncover the identities of creditors."'' 1 The Court stated that actual notice
is not required for those creditors who are not reasonably ascertainable 0
nor for those with merely conjectural claims.'0 2
It has long been the recommended practice for personal representatives
to assemble all available information concerning debts of the decedent. 0
Certainly, current bills or statements in the papers of the decedent would
render the creditor reasonably ascertainable. One commentator stated that
reasonable diligence would include "an inquiry of those of the decedent's
relatives, acquaintances, business associates, and professional advisers whom
the representative believes to be fertile sources of information.104°
The Court in Pope declined to decide whether the knowledge of the
personal representative, the wife of the decedent, that the decedent had a
long stay at the assignor hospital "translates into a knowledge of appellant's

claim."

5

However, it is inconceivable that reasonable diligence would not

include inquiring of the hospital.

constitutionally sufficient. In Orange v. Harrington, 649 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983), the Eastern District stated:
It is irrelevant that actual notice was afforded defendants because actual
notice given in any manner other than that provided by statute, cannot
supply constitutional validity to service under it, since due process requires
notice directed by the statute itself and not a voluntary gratuitous notice
resting in favor or discretion.
Id. at 933 (citing Harris v. Bates, 364 Mo. 1023, 1031, 270 S.W.2d 763, 769 (1954)).
In Orange, the mailed notice was service of summons, authorized only after filing
an affidavit stating why personal service cannot be served. This was not done in
that case. The holding in Orange seems to be based on the fact that there was
not technical compliance with the statute within the statutory time period.
The language quoted above is broader than the holding necessitated. It is
unlikely that the requirements of due process dictate this result. In State ex rel.
Deems v. Holtcamp, 245 Mo. 655, 670, 151 S.W 153, 157 (1912), the Missouri
Supreme Court, after determining that due process required notice to heirs or
creditors of a proceeding to sell incumbered land, stated "And though the statutes
do not in terms require notice, the law will imply that notice was intended." It
is not an illogical step to apply this concept to a statute which provides for
insufficient notice, and imply sufficient notice.
100. Pope, 108 S.Ct. at 1347.
101. Id.
102. Id. The Court cites Mullane for this proposition. Immediately after the
Mullane Court said that it did not "consider it unreasonable for the State to
dispense with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose interests are either
conjectural or future ... .", the Court cautioned "Whatever searches might be
required in another situation under ordinary standards of diligence, in view of the
character of the proceedings and the nature of the interests here involved we think
them unnecessary." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
103. Mo. Estate Administration § 4.6 (Mo. Bar 3d ed. 1984).
104. Falender, supra note 6, at 695.
105. Pope, 108 S.Ct. at 1348.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/12

14

Wilson: Wilson: New Requirements

19891

PROBATE CREDITOR NOTICE

Once a creditor is identified, he is entitled to better notice than that
afforded by publication. The Supreme Court has held that notice by mail
Due process also requires an accurate deis constitutionally sufficient.
scription of the actions required by the creditor in order to present his
claim. 1'
If a personal representative fails to make "reasonably diligent efforts,"
or negligently or fraudulently fails to mail the required notice to the creditor,
the creditor's constitutional rights are violated. 08 This violation is the effect
of the denial of the claim, not the failure to give notice.109 If his claim
is not allowed, the creditor is deprived of his property without due process
of law. Generally, one whose due process rights are violated is not bound
by the action which afforded him those rights." 0 Nevertheless, this question
remains: "What are the remedies available to a creditor entitled to notice
who did not receive it?"
Certain situations are easily analyzed. Pope made it clear that creditors
who are not reasonably ascertainable, or whose claims are conjectural are
not entitled to actual notice."' If the creditor does not appear and assert
the claim before the applicable statute of limitations has run, then the
claim is barred not by the nonclaim statute, but by the general statute of

limitations. 112
If there was not enough money in the estate to pay the debt had the
creditor been notified and the claim presented, the creditor was not damaged

106. The Mennonite Court stated "Notice by mail or other means as certain
to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition .... " Mennonite,
462 U.S. at 800. See also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982); Mullane,
339 U.S. at 319. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated that "Even
if beneficial, means of notice beyond those reasonably calculated to reach interested
parties are not required by due process in the context of foreclosures." Weigner
v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1988). But cf. Mullane, 339
U.S. at 315 ("[method of notice] must be such as one desirous of actually informing
the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it"). In Rau v. Cavenaugh,
500 F. Supp. 204 (D.S.D. 1980), the court held that neither publication, nor certified
letter were sufficient when the defendant had previously hand delivered certified
letters in foreclosure proceedings.
107. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914);
see also Delta Realty Co. v. Hunter, 347 Mo. 1108, 152 S.W.2d 45 (1941); Epperson
v. Sheldon, 729 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
108. Pope, 108 S.Ct. at 1348.
109. The fourteenth amendment protects against deprivation of property by
state action.
110. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320.
111. Pope, 108 S.Ct. at 1347.
112. Thompson v. Lyons, 281 Mo. 430, 452-53, 220 S.W. 942, 948 (1920);
State ex rel. Emmons v. Hollenbeck, 394 S.W.2d 82, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
See One 1964 Cadillac Sedan Seville v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Mo.
1974) (statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim against government after government had seized his car in violation of his due process rights).
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by the personal representative's noncompliance.' 3 Similarly, if the creditor
filed a claim within the nonclaim period without having received mailed
notice, he has not been damaged.
If the creditor is damaged by the personal representative's failure to
make a reasonably diligent effort, the creditor is entitled to relief. 114 This
relief will come from the personal representative, either personally or in
his capacity as personal representative, or from the estate before distribution
or from the distributees. 15
When courts are presented with this situation, they must deal with
several variables. Perhaps foremost among these is the culpability of the
personal representative. Did he conceal the creditor's identity, or merely
"miss one" in his investigation? This fact will surely affect the remedy
which the court provides. Policy considerations weigh against imposing
strict liability on the personal representative. The courts and the legislature
would hesitate to make the position of personal representative so "risky"
as to deter people from serving. However, policy also necessitates the
imposition of some liability as an incentive to act with due diligence." 6
Courts must also consider the time at which the claim is brought
forward. If the claim is not brought forward until after the final distribution
and discharge of the personal representative, the balance of the equities
may tip in favor of holding the personal representative liable for the amount
of the claim. 17 The creditor would be further harmed if forced to locate
and serve all the distributees, then prosecute his claim pro rata against
them." 8 The personal representative could be held liable, at a minimum,
for the cost of prosecuting such an action.

113. See, e.g. State ex rel. Bovard v. Weill, 353 Mo. 337, 182 S.W.2d 521
(1944).
114. More precisely, the creditor's claim is not barred by the non-claim statute.

The creditor retains his contract rights, subject to diminution according to the
statutory distribution formula.
115. Another possibility arises when a person does not respond honestly to
the inquiry of the personal representative. If the personal representative has performed the duty laid out in Pope, the creditor's action would appear to be a tort

action against the inquiree.
116.

Falender, supra note 6, at 696.

117. "It is clear that all claims against the estate of a deceased person must
be paid in the order of their priority, and a personal representative who pays a
claim out of order or in the wrong proportion may be liable for the overpayment."
Estate of James, 431 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). However, Mo. Rnv.
STAT. § 473.820.2 (1986) limits the individual liability of the personal representative
to obligations arising out of "ownership or control of the estate or for torts
committed in the course of administration of the estate only if he is personally at
fault." If the personal representative acted fraudulently, a claim must be brought
against the personal representative within two years of the discovery of the fraud.

Mo. REv. STAT. § 472.013 (1986).
118. If the creditor was fraudulently deprived of notice, the creditor must
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/12
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If the assets have not been distributed, and the estate has not been
closed, ease of administration would make ordering the claim paid from
the estate attractive. If the personal representative has not been discharged
or received his compensation, the court may conceivably order the claim

paid from the compensation he is due," ' or impose a surcharge for the
breach of duty. 20 If the personal representative
has been discharged, the
2
damaged creditor must sue within one year.' '
As personal representatives' potential liability increases, the bond requirement will become more important. 122 As distributions become more
subject to outstanding claims, refund provisions will also become more
crucial. If the personal representative makes a partial distribution without
obtaining security for return of the property, he can be held liable to an
interested party for any loss that results. 123 Thus the prudent personal
representative should obtain a receipt for any distribution providing for
the return of the property upon demand, at any time, when needed for
satisfaction of lawful claims against the estate.'2
Another possible remedy available to the creditor would be to file an
action to impose a constructive trust for the amount of the claim. As
discussed above, a personal representative serves in a fiduciary capacity
toward both potential distributees and creditors.'2 A constructive trust is
an equitable device available to prevent unjust enrichment "where a party
has been wrongfully deprived of some right, title, benefit, or interest in
property as a result of fraud or violation of confidence or faith reposed
in another.' ' 26 The creditor must show by "clear, cogent and convincing
evidence" 1 27 that the establishment of a constructive trust is justified. This

bring the action within two years of the discovery of the fraud, and "no proceeding
may be brought against one not a perpetrator of the fraud later than ten years

after the time of commission of the fraud." Mo. Pv. STAT. § 472.013 (1986).
119.

Id. § 473.153.4.

120.
121.

Id.§ 473.597.
Id.§ 473.660.
122. Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.157 (1986) requires that every personal representative obtain a bond in an amount fixed by the.court for the protection of interested
parties. Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.160 (1986) eliminates the bond requirement (1) when
the testator expressed in the will that no bond be required, (2) when an asset may
be deposited as security, (3) when the personal representative is a corporation which
has met certain financial requirements, or (4) when the court finds that a bond
is otherwise not required.
123. Id. § 473.613.3.
124. Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.660 (1986) requires that receipts or other evidence
of distribution shall be filed prior to obtaining an order of discharge.
125. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
126. Schultz v. Schultz, 637 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
127. Sauer v. Hicks, 662 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Mahler v.
Tieman, 550 S.W.2d 623, 628 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
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would involve proving that the creditor was reasonably ascertainable 28 and
that the claim would have been allowed if presented during the claims
period. The creditor would not have to prove actual fraud on the part of

the personal representative, in that the breach of the fiduciary relationship
is considered constructive fraud. 29
The fact that the alleged trustee, the distributee, is blameless should

not prevent the establishment of a constructive trust. 30 Distributees are
not entitled to the assets of the estate until the debts are paid.' 3 ' If the

creditor's claim exhausts the estate, no assets reach the heirs at law.3 2 The
distributee is no worse off than he would have been had the personal
33
representative exercised due diligence and discovered the creditor initially

128. Section 473.034.2 of the House Bill No. 145 provides: "The burden of
proof on any issue as to whether a creditor was known or reasonably ascertainable
by the personal representative shall be on the creditor." H.B. 145, 85th Gen.
Assembly, 1st Regular Sess. (1989).
129. See Ward Parkway Shops, Inc. v. C.S.W. Consultants, 542 S.W.2d 308,
313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("The breach of the fiduciary relationship ... was a
constructive fraud sufficient to support the constructive trust and to prevent the
unjust enrichment .

. . .");

see also Thompson v. Williams, 671 S.W.2d 442 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1984).
130. A constructive trust acts to "provide a remedy in cases of fraud, actual
or constructive, by making the person who ... has acquired property under such
circumstances as make it inequitable for him to retain it, a trustee for the person
defrauded or injured by such fraudulent or wrongful conduct." Suhre v. Busch,
343 Mo. 679, 123 S.W.2d 8, 15 (1938). But, in the case of fraud the claim must
be brought within two years after discovery, and within ten years after the commission of the fraud. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 472.013 (1986).
131. In re Carlin's Estate, 226 Mo. App. 622, 47 S.W.2d 213 (1932). Mo.
REv. STAT. § 473.397 (1986) sets out the priority in which claims are to be paid:
1. Costs;
2. Expenses of administration which include compensation for the personal
representative and attorney;
3. Exempt property, family and homestead allowances;

4. Funeral expenses;
5. Debts and taxes due the United States of America;
6. Expenses of the last sickness, wages of servants, claims for medicine
and medical attendance during the last sickness, and the reasonable cost
of a tombstone;
7. Debts and taxes due the State of Missouri, any county, or any political
subdivision of the State of Missouri;
8. Judgments rendered against the decedent during his lifetime;
9. All other claims not barred by Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.360.
No claim of one class may be paid until all claims within superior classes are paid.
"If there are not sufficient assets to pay the whole of any one class, claims shall
be paid in proportion to their amounts." Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.430 (1986).
132. Estate of Igoe v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 717 S.W.2d 524
(Mo. 1986) (en banc).
133. The fact that the distributee may have disposed of the asset, or altered
his position in reliance on the asset, illustrates the complexity of this situation.
This is one of the problems that the nonclaim statute was intended to prevent.
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While this is but one possible resolution, it serves to point out that
there are conflicting interests involved in the problem of probate notice.
The objectives of our whole probate system are in direct competition with
the need to protect the due process rights of creditors.
Until courts and legislatures better define these duties and liabilities,
it would seem unreasonable to err on the side of too little effort. In view
of the possible consequences, specifically an unknown, reasonably ascertainable creditor who could conceivably be granted relief from the personal
representative, personal representatives would be well advised to publish
the notice of letters granted, investigate thoroughly, and mail a copy of
the published notice to all imaginable creditors.
MARSHALL WILSON
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